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GRANTING REFUGE FROM ISLAM: THE CANADIAN
REFUGEE DETERMINATION PROCESS AND THE
CASUALTIES OF ISLAMIC POLICIES
OLIVIER FULDAUERt

A number of key divergences between Islamic and Canadian legal
regimes are generating a growing stream of refugees into Canada.
There is every sign that this trend will grow as political forces on
both sides map out their ideological position in law with greater
precision. Recent years have seen the introduction into the
normative legal system of many Islamic states' "Islamization" laws.
In Canada, the refugee determination process has seen a correlating,
but opposite, movement to recognize persecution in its more
systemic guises.
This paper will focus on those refugee claims from Islamic states
which have been accepted on a ground that is related to either
Islamic law or Islamic culture. The resulting set of cases illustrates a
number of key distinctions between some Islamic regimes and
Canadian law which are only litigated in the context of refugee
claims. A picture thus emerges of the conflict between the refugee
determination procedure in Canada, which embodies Western
human rights discourse, and Islamic law, as expounded by Islamic
resurgence movements in a number of states.
The rift between Western and Islamic legal cultures draws on a
history of mutual misunderstanding, including a hundred years of
ill-will created by the brutality of European colonialism. The fact
that Islam is still struggling with modernity adds a further layer of
complexity. Taking a broad view, it is clear that the differences
between Islamic and Western legal cultures are not amenable to
ready conciliation. It is also clear that the debates engendered by
the issues highlighted in the refugee cases that follow continue to be
live ones on both ends of the refugee track.

t B.A., M.A. (British Columbia),LL.B. (Dalhousie) 1995.
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The definition of a Convention refugee is laid out in subsection
2(1) of the
"Convention Refugee" means any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion,
(i) is outside the country of the person's nationality
and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country, or
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the
country of the person's former habitual residence and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to
return to that country ... 1

Before reflecting on the application of this definition, it is
important to note that there are two structural components to
determining refugee status. The above definition points out the
criteria required by the accepting state, but it is also useful to think
of refugees as created by the accepting state. The refugee
determination process is one of matching the life experience of
individuals with the public policy of an accepting state. In a sense,
no refugee is created if no one (state or NGO) is willing to label (and
extend protection to) a person as such. Viewed from this
perspective, refugees are produced by differences between
Canadian and Islamic public policy systems. There are clearly
observable public policy sectors which are responsible for the
creation of refugees in the originating state and their corresponding
acceptance in the receiving state. The policy of the refugee-creating
state is observed in the statements of claimants and the policy of
the receiving state is reflected in its reasons for granting refugee
status.
In reflecting on the operation of Islamic religion, culture, or law
that one sees in the cases described below it is helpful to recognize
that Islam encompasses a diversity of views and practices.
Moreover, the following study displays some of the shortcomings

1

Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. I-2, as am. by R.S.C 1985, c. 28 (4th Supp.),
s.1 (2).
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of a typically western mode of analyzing Islam according to its
flaws, a habit which distorts the larger picture of Islam. 2 This study
should thus not be taken as a general illustration how Islamic
governments function, but instead as an illustration of the most
significant consequences of the policies of a number of Islamic
governments in terms of Canadian refugee law. The discussion
below groups cases where Islamic immigrants to Canada have been
successful in obtaining refugee status around seven key issues.

I. GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Canada's Gender Guidelines, which acknowledge the fact of
gender-based discrimination in the refugee context, were
introduced in 1993. 3 In 1994 an estimated 195 women were
granted refugee status under these Guidelines, among them are a
number who fled some form persecution in the guise of Islamic
religion, culture, or law. 4 Three cases where the Gender Guidelines
were applied to give women refugee status are helpful to illustrate
the serious legal disabilities that women in some Islamic states
suffer.
In Re Y. (}.Z.),5 the claimant, a young woman from an affluent
background, identified herself as a non-practising Muslim and as
belonging to the group of Iranians who oppose the postrevolutionary Islamic government. Having been educated in Europe
and westernized in general, she found the obligation to wear the
Hejab and Islamic dress oppressive:
As a woman in Iran I have [been] forced to wear
unbearable, degrading clothes, which [make] a woman
feel shame and oppression. I was harassed on the streets
by the guards, stopped several times, harassed, insulted,
detained and interrogated because of my clothes, makeup and nail polish. I was forced to wear dark colours in

2

Hammudah 'Abd al 'Ati, The Family Structure in Islam (American Trust
Publications, 1977) at 281-282.
3 !RB Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related
Persecution (Immigration and Refugee Board, 9 March 1993).
4 Canadian Press (9 March 1995) (QL).
5 [1993] C.R.D.D. No. 335 (QL).
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the heat of Iran which often reaches 40 degrees in the
summer.

She was detained a number of times including once while shopping
with a male cousin when they were accused of being a lovers. They
were ordered not to appear in public together again. On another
occasion, while driving home alone at midnight she was stopped
and accused of being a prostitute. On a third occasion she was
questioned for an hour after meeting her male employer in the
lobby of a hotel. Finally, during a party at a friend's home where
everyone was in western clothes, armed guards forced their way in
and detained all those present. They were held for a number of
days during which they were humiliated and beaten. They were all
charged with "behaviour not conforming to Islamic values." The
claimant feared that she would receive treatment similar to that of a
friend who had been raped and tortured during two months of
imprisonment. She left the country before the arrival of her court
date.
The Refugee Board noted that the "laws under which she would
face punishment do not conform to internationally recognized
human rights standards," which could include the death penalty for
defying the dress codes. The Board concluded that in view of the
arbitrariness of the application of the law and the range
and severity of the punishment, including the possibility
of execution, clearly any such prosecution of the claimant
if she were to return to Iran would amount to
persecution. 6

In the second case, Re Y. (MJ), 7 the applicant from Pakistan was a
single woman who was raped and became pregnant. The
perpetrator was a member of a rival student group, the Muslim
Students Federation. She was an activist for the student wing of the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP). She reported the rape two days after
it had occurred, however, the police disbelieved her because she had
delayed in making the report. The standard of proof for rape is
either the confession of the perpetrator or the eye-witness testimony
of four adult, pious male Muslims. Should the charge of rape be
unsuccessful, she would be subject to a charge of qazf (defaming the

6

Ibid.

7

[1993] C.R.D.D. No. 339 (QL).
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accused), or zina (having sexual relations outside marriage). To
defend a charge of zina she would be required to meet the same
standard of proof as for rape. However, should the victim become
pregnant, as in this case, she would be charged with zina in any
event. The fact that abortions are illegal in Pakistan makes the
situation of raped women who become pregnant even more
difficult.
In the third case illustrating a positive determination under the
Gender Guidelines, Re T. (WT.), 8 the claimant, a Christian woman
from Sudan, experienced a similar lack of recourse after being
raped. She testified that her home was broken into and she was
raped and robbed. Although she was able to identify the offenders
in a police line-up and the police were able to gather physical
evidence from her apartment identifying them, the accused were
released because at trial the claimant's testimony was inadmissible
as a female non-Muslim. The claimant also stated that she knew of
other attacks on Christian women where prosecution was similarly
refused. The Board concluded that:
Although the claimant in this case feared a criminal act,
the concern for her safety however, stemmed from her
belief that she would not be able to obtain the necessary
protection. Her evidence was that she reported the
incident concerning her rape and robbery and even had
proof of the culprits' involvement, her testimony however
was inadmissible due to the fact that she was a woman
and a Christian. The judge did not hesitate to express
this fact to her in court. This action is, in the panel's
opinion, an admission that the state is unwilling to
provide necessary protection to the claimant because of
her gender and religion. 9

In each of these three cases the Refugee Board has identified a
gender-based discrimination institutionalized in the justice system
in the name of Islam, and in each case the women were either
persecuted by the state or unable to obtain the protection of the
state. Gender-based persecution, together with persecution based
on religion, are the two areas where the differences between Islamic
and Canadian norms diverge the greatest.

8

[1993] C.R.D.D. No. 402 (QL).

9

Ibid.
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II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS WITHIN
ISLAM

The Islamic extremist movement, with its many regional variations,
is only the harsher part of a more general Islamic renewal which has
been under way since early in the twentieth century. Extremist
Islam, which began more recently in the 1970s, is in its various
guises the stimulus for much of the strife faced by the refugee
claimants discussed in this paper. In the case of Re N (E.B.) 10 a
Lebanese woman and her children were admitted as refugees after
members of the Hezbollah tried to recruit the woman for their
cause. Her husband had already fled the country as a result of the
Hezbollah's attempts to recruit him. The claimant said that she had
refused because "the members of the Hezbollah group were
engaged in what she considered immoral acts of violence based on
religious fanaticism." Furthermore "she ·;,ras morally and politically
opposed to the activities and methods of the group and perceived
them as criminals responsible for the destruction of Lebanon."

III. ISLAMIC JUSTICE
Two successful claims for refugee status involving members of
the legal community in Somalia illustrate the extent to which
politics can infuse the operation of Islamic justice. In Salah v.
Minister of Employment & Immigration (1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d)
254 (Imm. App. Bd.), the son of a judge described how he and his
family were persecuted partly because his father had decided a land
ownership dispute against a party who was the Minister of
Agriculture and partly because of their membership in what was
then a politically less-powerful tribe. In a second refugee
determination, Re U(NB.), 11 the President of the Supreme Court
appointed during the Siad Barre regime fled following the collapse
of that government fearing persecution on the basis of his judicial
position and his tribal membership. These two situations present a
striking contrast to the administration of the judiciary in Canada
which is characterized by independence from government.

10
11

[1990] C.R.D.D. No. 246 (QL).
[1992] C.R.D.D. No. 422 (QL).
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The administration of justice in Islamic countries has also been
found to be a source of persecution. Re C. (Y.F.) 12 dramatically
illustrates the operation of justice as a tool of the state. In this case
an Iranian male applicant had protested, with two friends, while
Iranian government officials bulldozed the homes of the poor, m
some cases with their occupants still inside. In his words,
I could not stand the inhumane situation any longer, and
I ran to one of [sic] municipal officers and begged him to
stop the destruction. l3

After being forced to give their names and addresses to armed
police officers, the three fled when the police were distracted by a
disturbance. As a result of this occurrence, one of the three was
executed after being convicted of "various charges which included
creating terror, the use of firearms and setting fire to government
buildings." The Board found that this person had been falsely
charged and executed. The second friend had been arrested, but his
situation was unknown.
It was material to the panel that the Iranian government is
dominated by clerics who are imposing Islamic values and that
"there is no distinction between religion and politics; everything is
viewed through an Islamic perspective." In view of these
circumstances, the panel concluded that although no charges had
been brought against the claimant in Iran,
it is our considered view . . . that this regime could so
accuse him. 'Given' the claimant's past political record
and his intervention in the Mashad incident, 'given' that
his name was noted and that he was accused of arousing
unrest, 'given' the circumstances of [the first friend's]
execution ... and 'given' the government's perception of
those it regarded as the perpetrators of the Mashad
disturbances, we believe ... it is reasonable to believe that
the regime would think of him as a political threat. 14

These refugee cases, taken with the many others that recount
unjust detention or torture, cast a negative light on Islamic justice.
While Islamic justice does not typically operate in disregard of

12

[1993] C.R.D.D. No. 152 (QL).

!3
14

Ibid.
Ibid.
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fairness 15 even in those states where it is least refined, the traditional
link between government and the administration of justice in Islam
is a frailty which is easily exploited for political ends. 16 When the
operation of Islamic justice is undermined in this manner the
refugee system can only compensate in a minor way by offering
refuge to the most seriously aggrieved victims who are able to leave.

IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
In spite of the Qur'anic admonition in s_ra 2:256 that "there is no
compulsion in religion," an effort to coerce conversion to Islam
accompanies many acts of religious persecution. The Qur 'anic
admonition against forcing people to convert is a value shared by
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 17 and international
human rights instruments.
Islam has a tradition of toleration for its Jewish and Christian
minorities ( ahl al-kitab or "people of the Book"), and occasionally
even those who were loosely identified as Sabians. But Religious
toleration was never universal, and its scope has been sharply
restricted by Muslim extremists with the result that some nonMuslims are targeted for persecution.
In Re L. (KC.), 18 a Sikh family from Malaysia fled religious
persecution and attempts at forcing them to convert to Islam and
were accepted as refugees in Canada. In his Personal Information
Form (PIF) the father enumerated a series of discriminations he
faced as a Sikh. The father, who worked as a school teacher, faced
persecution at his job. He went to the police to report a violent
incident and was detained for two days and beaten. He was later
told that his life would be better if he became a Muslim and that if
he did not his life was in danger. After having to take an unpaid

!5 For a study of the sophistication which Islamic justice has achieved see M.
Khadduri, The Islamic Conception ofjustice (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984).
!6 A. A. Sachedina "The Ideal and Real in Islamic Law" in R. S. Khare ed.,
Working Papers: Perspectives on Islamic Law, Justice and Society Number 3,
September 1987 (Virginia: Committee on the Comparative Study of the Individual
and Society Centre for Advanced Studies University of Virginia, 1987) at 37.
l 7 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
18 [1993] C.R.D.D. No. 260 (QL).
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leave of absence from his work he went to discuss his problems with
a member of a political party. The family was subsequently
harassed in their home on a weekly basis. The children were told
that if they did not become Muslim their father would go prison.
An attempt to escape the situation by moving did not work and an
attempt to leave the country resulted in the father being detained
for a week.
Under Islam, apostasy is perceived to be a rebellion against
God and thus carries a harsh punishment. 19 Blasphemy is treated in
much the same way, as shown by the cases of Salman Rushdie, who
continues to require protection from the threat to his life posed by
the fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini, and Taslima Nasreen, who has
been charged in Bangladesh with "blaspheming the Koran," and has
been forced to flee. 20
In 1984 Ordinance XX amended the Pakistan Penal Code by
the addition of sections 298B and 298C which prohibit the
religious expression of Ahmadis, a heterodox sect that began in the
Punjab in the late nineteenth century. Some Ahmadi practices were
derived from Christianity, such as proselytizing and rituals
surrounding conversion. Despite their differences from mainstream
Sunni Islam, Ahmadis consider themselves to be Muslim. Ahmadis
are divided into two groups, Lahorites and Quadianis. Section
298C reads as follows:
Any person of the Quadiana group or the Lahori group
(who call themselves Ahmadis or by any other name),
who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or
calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or
propagates his faith or invites others to accept his faith,
by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representation, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the
religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 21

In addition, in 1986 the Pakistan Penal Code was amended to
make available the death penalty for those who derogate the
Prophet:

19
20
21

Quran 3:86-88, 4:137, 16:106.
Manchester Guardian Weekly 152:16 (16 April 1995) 4.
Cited in Re V (A. U), [1992] C.R.D.D. No. 104 (QL).
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Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representation, or by any Imputation, innuendo, or
insinuation, directly or indirectly defiles the sacred name
of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him)
shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life,
and shall also be liable to fine. 22

The constitutionality of Ordinance XX was affirmed by the
Pakistan Supreme Court after which those who brought the
constitutional challenge were prosecuted in accordance with its
provisions. 23
It is in the context of these laws that twelve successful claims
under the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board were made since 1989. This
represents a small number of the total number of claimants that
have sought refugee status on the basis of these provisions. Each
claim for refugee status has to be weighed according to a subjective
and an objective test to determine whether the applicant has a
"well-founded fear of persecution" under paragraph 2(l)(a) of the
Immigration Act 24 The facts leading to the twelve positive
determinations for Ahmadis, in chronological order, are
enumerated below. It may be observed that these cases represent
the threshold of Canada's willingness to shelter people from some
of the worst by-products of Islam in its extreme political form.
Of the three successful claims in 1989, the first, Re G. (/. G.) 2 5
was a male applicant who was admitted because he was imprisoned
by the police for twenty-four days following a complaint by a
citizen. With reference to his imprisonment "he told the Refugee
Division of the many beatings which he received and threats of
what the police would do if he did not swear that he was not a
Muslim." Following his release, a warrant was issued for his arrest
but the applicant refused to report to the police. The Board also
noted that both brothers of the applicant were arrested for
practising their religion.

22

Ibid.
Re M (EM), [1994] C.R.D.D. No. 180 (QL).
24 R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. l; UNHCR, United Nations Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status paras. 38, 40-42; Rajudeen
v. ME.I (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.CA.); Re G. (!.G.), [1989] C.R.D.D. No. 161 (QL).
25 [1989] C.R.D.D. No. 161 (QL).
23
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The second positive determination in 1989, Re C.(KZ),26 was
in favour of a male applicant who, though never personally targeted,
lived in an area where Ahmadis were targeted by angry riots, had
their homes burned, were killed, and were not able to receive
protection from the police.
In the third case, Re Q. (!. 0.), 27 a male applicant, was admitted
because he and his family, including his parents and brothers, had
been persecuted by the Mullahs and the police in Pakistan.
There was one successful claim in 1990. In Re N(C..D.) 28 the
male claimant was politically active for the minority rights of his
ethnic group as a member of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)
for which he suffered persecution by other groups and the police.
He met his wife, an Ahmadi, and converted to her faith. In 1989
rioters burned MQM homes, including the claimant's while his wife
and child were forced to stay inside. The police were present but
did nothing. The applicant said that he believed his family was
burned because they were Ahmadi, and he feared for his life.
In 1991 there were three successful claims for Ahmadis. The
first, Re J(G. W), 29 was for a family including a husband, wife, and
child. Although none had suffered persecution personally, the
husband was vice-president of the Ahmadiyya Movement and was
thus well-known as an Ahmadi. The panel accepted that this made
him a target as other prominent Ahmadis had been jailed,
assaulted, or murdered.
The second positive result in 1991, Re G.(Z.M.),3° was for a
male claimant who held a position of missionary and religious
teacher of the Ahmadiyya Movement. As a result of activities
connected with his position, he was attacked on three occasions by
his Sunni neighbours. The police refused to take any action to
apprehend the assailants or protect him, and was instead told that
"if he comes back with such a report his life would be in danger."
In the third positive determination in 1991, Re j.(0.H),3 1 the
male claimant was identified as an Ahmadi on a bus and taken to a

26
27
28

29
30

31

[1989]
[1989]
[1990]
[1991]
[1991]
[1991]

C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.

145 (QL).
110 (QL).
518 (QL).
690 (QL).
55 (QL).
604 (QL).
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police station and accused of preaching the Ahmadi faith. Although
he denied this, the police told him that "Ahmadis are always
preaching their religion." They detained him for two days during
which he was severely beaten. The police told him that he would be
"in serious trouble" if he was found preaching again.
In 1992 there were four successful Ahmadi claims. The first
positive determination in 1992, Re V. (A. U.), 32 was for a male
claimant. In making its determination the Board noted that the
"close-knit nature of neighbourhoods in Pakistan would make it
difficult for an Ahmadi to hide his roots" and that any expression
of Ahmadi faith carried a severe punishment under amendment
295C of the Penal Code. The claimant in this case had the duty of
informing other Ahmadis of the time of prayer in person as it was
forbidden to advertise this publicly.
The second successful claim, Re D. (N W), 33 was in favour of a
male claimant and his wife and child. The husband had great
difficulty getting work in the field of computers because of his
religion. After establishing his own business in a new city, his life
was threatened by the business people in that neighbourhood
because he refused to become a Muslim. The family decided to
leave Pakistan when the husband's uncle was attacked by armed
gunmen.
The third positive determination in 1992, Re 1.(E.Q.), 34 was for
a male lawyer. He testified that his wife died in a car accident that
occurred while he was trying to drive away from a mob that was
threatening them. In 1991 a criminal complaint was laid against
him under subsections 295(a), (b), and (c) alleging that the
claimant had "uttered words with deliberate intent to wound
religious feelings, defied the Holy Prophet, misused epithets and
titles, and called himself a Muslim." He was told by a policeman to
protect himself.
The fourth successful claim in 1992 was in Re H.(R.L.).35 The
claimant was forced to leave his job after it was discovered that he
was an Ahmadi and he was severely beaten by his co-workers. He
then returned to his parents' home, when neighbours informed the

32
33
34
35

[1992]
[1992]
[1992]
[1992]

C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.
C.R.D.D. No.

104 (QL).
554 (QL).
326 (QL).
90 (QL).
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police that he was posing as a Muslim. He was detained for three
days during which he was interrogated and pressured to renounce
his faith.
Interestingly, the Board in this case also noted section 153A of
the Pakistan Penal Code which reads:
(a)Whoever . . . by words ... promotes or incites on
grounds of religion ... disharmony or feeling of enmity,
hatred or ill-will between religious groups or
communities, or
(b)commits, or incites any other person to commit any
act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
between different religious groups ... on any ground
whatsoever ... shall be punished with imprisonment of
up to five years. 36

The panel stated that "the Government of Pakistan itself violates
section l 53A" by inciting hatred against its Ahmadi community
and that this has led to human rights violations, violence, and
murder which are not prosecuted. The fact that Ahmadis are unable
to rely on protection from the state is in each of these cases a factor
in the determination to grant refugee status.
In February, 1994, another positive determination was made.37
The female claimant was granted refugee status because she would
no longer be able to rely on the protection of her daughter, as her
daughter was also fleeing Pakistan. The claimant's two sons had
previously gained asylum in Canada. The age of the applicant,
between 65 and 90, was significant. The panel was sympathetic to
the fact that the applicant would neither be able to defend herself
nor rely on protection from the government of Pakistan.
The manner of deciding these cases is based on a determination
that the individual claimant is at risk, which in the above cases is
simply that the claimants' lives were threatened by more extreme
Islamic political forces, in each case because of the religion of the
claimant. The fact that the government, as an instrument of
extremist Islam, was in many cases the perpetrator, or at least
complicit in the carrying out of these injustices, was part of the
reason why refugee status was granted.
36 Ibid.
37

Re M(E.M), [1994) C.R.D.D. No. 180 (QL).
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V. HOMOSEXUALITY

0 nly in the last decade has homosexuality ceased to be a criminal

offence in Canada. 38 An exception was enacted in 1968-69 for
persons over the age of twenty-one who were acting privately.39 It is
interesting to note the parallel with the United States which
illustrates better the ongoing tension around criminalizing
homosexuality. In the early 1960s all of the jurisdictions in the
United States criminalized sodomy; today almost half still do.
Many jurisdictions in the United States follow the Model Penal
Code which uses a scheme similar to that which was used in
Canada of criminalizing deviant sexual intercourse with an
exception where the parties consent and are of a certain age. 40
The Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward 41
recognized that, for the purpose of paragraph 2(l)(a) of the
membership in a "particular social group" included members of
"groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic." 42
This category would include "individuals fearing persecution on
such basis as gender, linguistic background and sexual
•
.
onentat10n
.... "43
There are two cases where Muslim homosexual males were
recognized as refugees by Canada. In the first case, Re N (K U.), 44
the applicant was from Bangladesh. The claimant was discovered by
police while committing a homosexual act which was illegal. The
applicant was forced to bribe the officer to escape being reported.
The applicant was then subjected to repeated blackmail by the
police officer. The Board recognized that in Bangladesh
homosexuality is a serious Islamic crime with serious consequences:

38

The following sections of the Criminal Code were repealed by R.S.C. 1985, c.
19 (3rd Supp.), s. 2: s. 155, "Buggery"; section 157, "Acts of Gross Indecency"; and
section 158, "exception Re Acts in Private Between Husband and Wife or
Consenting Adults." Section 156, "Indecent Assault on a Male" was repealed by S.C.
1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 9.
39
40

Ibid

43

Ibid

44

[1991] C.R.D.D. No. 1140 (QL).

W. B. Rubenstein, ed. Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law (New York: The New
Press, 1993) at 87-88.
41 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
42 Ibid at 739.
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The most severe punishment laid down in the quran for
homosexuality is death by stoning, and the least severe of
which is one hundred lashes. Because of their religious
origins, those harsh laws and harsh punishment cannot be
challenged or be subject to scrutiny in Bangladesh. The
claimant testified that the community in Bangladesh uses
indiscriminate violence against those discovered as
homosexuals or practising homosexual acts.45
The Board used the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, and followed the Federal
Court of Appeal decision of Ward 46 in finding that "membership in
a particular social group" in paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Immigration
Act included homosexuals.
The second case, Re H.(Y.N), 47 applied the Supreme Court's
analysis in Ward to find that homosexuals do have "membership in
a particular social group" for the purpose of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the
Immigration Act. Applying the objective and subjective tests set out
in Rajudeen v. ME.I 48 the Board found the applicant from Pakistan
to be a refugee. The applicant in this case was also a political activist
as a member of the PPP, which at the time preceding the applicant's
departure from Pakistan was opposed by a coalition of Islamic
groups under the umbrella of the Islami Jamuri Ithad (IJI). After
being "outed" by the police following the suicide of a lover, the
applicant suffered persecution, including imprisonment, torture,
and rape, at the hands of the police and IJI members. The applicant
stated that according to the IJI, "homosexuals are sick, and wanted
to make an example of me."49
The panel also noted Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code
which criminalizes "unnatural offences":
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the
order of nature with any man, woman or animal shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description which shall not be less

45 Ibid.
46 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1990] 2 F.C. 667, (C.A.), affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Canada, supra note 41.
47 [1994] C.R.D.D. No. 13 (QL).
48 (1984), 55 N.D. 129 (F.CA.) at 134.
49 Supra note 47.
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than two years nor more than ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine. 5o

The Board, citing "A Global View of Lesbian and Gay
Liberation and Oppression," The Third Pink Book (Buffalo:
Prometheus Books) concluded that the law criminalizing
homosexuality is enforced in "a persecutory manner" in Pakistan. In
this respect, the Board remarked that the situation was similar to
that of the Ahamadis under Ordinance XX 51 as not all
homosexuals are targeted by the law but those who are targeted
have good reason to fear persecution.

VI. POLYGAMY
Polygamy is one example of where Canada discriminates against a
value tolerated by many, but not all, Islamic states. 52 Polygamy
exists in Islam only in the sense of polygyny-a husband having
more than one wife.
In Canada, polygamy is a criminal offence. Paragraph 293(l)(a)
of the Criminal Code 53 prohibits "any form of polygamy" or "any
kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time,
whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of
marriage." Thus even though Islamic law traditionally permits a
man to marry up to four wives, such a polygamous marriage cannot
occur legally in Canada, and nor will a foreign polygamous
marriage be recognized as valid in Canada. 54

so Ibid. The panel cited: Exhibit C-7, Index 2, item 1, Pakistan: Information
regarding Muslim Law on Homosexuality, Response to Information Request
PAK9462, irbdc, November 19, 1991.
5l See Section 4: "Religious Freedom"
5 2 The practice of polygyny in Islam is affirmed in legislation by Egypt, Jordan,
Iraq, Morocco and Kuwait. Polygyny, however, is not uniformly practised in the
Muslim world. In Syria, and Tunisia, for example, it is prohibited by statute. In
addition, polygamous marriages are not the norm in those countries that permit
them. The general trend has in fact been away from polygynous marriage toward
monogamous marriage since the early twentieth century, as a result of European
influence. See J. J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status, Second Edition
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1990) at 66-67.
53 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
54 J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws Third ed. (Toronto; Vancouver:
Butterworths, 1994) at 336-41.
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However vexing to modern gender equality discourse, there are
compelling reasons why Canada should consider recognizing
foreign polygamous marriages. The foundation of the present
policy against recognition of foreign polygamous marriages has its
foundations in Christian morality.55 In the context of
constitutionally guaranteed religious equality,56 it is possible that
this policy is unnecessarily discriminatory. More importantly, it is
rationally unsustainable for Canada to effectively project its
religious morality upon other nationalities by refusing to recognize
formally valid polygamous marriages on this ground.
The policy of not recognizing polygamous marriage is most
likely to produce injustice in the immigration context where the
admission into Canada of spouses is restricted to monogamous
couples.57
Canada is, of course, entitled to regulate morality within its
boundaries and there may be sound reasons to prohibit polygymy.5 8
At present, the clearest expression of Canadian public policy on
polygamy is found in the Criminal Code where it is broadly
characterized as criminal:
293.(1) Every one who
(a) practices or enters into or in any manner agrees or
consents to practice or enter into
(i) any form of polygamy, or

55 Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee, (1866), L.R. 1 P & D 130 (Eng. Mat. Ct.); Lee
Sheck Yew v. A.-G.B. C, [1924] 1 W.W.R. 753 at 754 (B.C.C.A.).
56 Freedom of religion is guaranteed in section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. The Charter, together with Canada's
changing demography, argue for a more tolerant attitude toward the religious
practice of others that was argued in 1959 by Professor Laskin (as he then was) in
"An Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights" (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 77, in
which he stated that: "Freedom of religion and of conscience will not, in the views
of the courts of the common-law countries, justify human sacrifice or
polygamy ...."
57 "Spouse" is defined to include only monogamous, opposite-sex couples. See
Immigration Regulations, 1978 SOR/78-172 as am. by SOR/85-225.
58 For a Muslim-feminist critique of a proposal to implement the Shar_'a in
Canada see Shahnaz Khan, "Canadian Muslim Women and Shari'a Law: A
Feminist Response to 'Oh! Canada!"' 6 CJWL/RFD (1992) 52 at 59-62.
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(ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one
person at the same time, whether or not it is by law
recognized as a binding form of marriage; or
(b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony,
contract or consent that purports to sanction a
relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii),
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.59
In the refugee context it is possible that the polygamy
prohibition will not be a substantial hurdle. In Hernandez v. Canada
(Minister of Employment & Immigration), 60 the Federal Court
quashed a refusal to admit seven claimants who formed a commune
under the Refugee Claims Backlog Regulations, SOR/86-701, on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The order quashing the
application was granted on the ground that each applicant should
have been assessed individually. In this case the Judge noted that:
While their lifestyle and what appears to frequently be a
polygamous relationship within the commune are not
normally acceptable within Canada, they do not appear
to have been troublesome nor to have broken any
Canadian laws. Apparently [the women's] relationship
with [the male leader of the group] did not result from
any marriage to him, as there is no suggestion that the
marriages of the four who are now married to Canadian
citizens or a permanent resident are bigamous, nor that
the said marriages are not legal. 61
The judge's interpretation of the law cannot be sustained on any
reasonable reading of the Criminal Code. However, the group had
clearly ended their polygamous activities. Had they continued the
practice of polygamy it is unlikely that their applications would
have been received as favourably. Arguably, however, the principle
that each claimant is entitled to an individual evaluation should
extend to all refugee claims and the question of being party to a
polygamous marriage in Canada becomes a separate issue.

59 R.S.C. 1985., c. C-46.
60

6l

(1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 9 (F.C).
Ibid. at 12.
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VII. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
While Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) 62 is associated with Islam,
its only real connection to Islam is its geographical coincidence in
North Africa and the Middle East. In spite of this, those who
practice FGM typically believe that its practice is religious or at least
moral, 63 and it is typically identified by others as an Islamic issue.
The issue was brought to the attention of Canadians with the
influx, in recent years, of refugees from Somalia. The reaction has
been one of horror by Canadians, mirrored by shock by Somalis at
being singled out for attack. 64 The Quebec Human Rights
Commission has given notice that parents and doctors who are
party to any FGM will be prosecuted vigorously. The threat of FGM
has also been used as ammunition in a custody dispute against a
father from Somalia. 65 While the government has been called on to
outlaw the practice, 66 the Justice Minister has stated that the
Criminal Code provisions for assault causing bodily harm (section
267), aggravated assault (sections 7(3) and 268), and criminal
negligence causing death (section 220) already criminalizes the
practice.67 Instead, the Justice Minister advocates "education and
enforcement." In recognizing that the issue is a real one for
Canadians, he stated that:
It's tragic. It has to be stopped. It's going on, at least to
some extent, either because people don't understand that
it's unlawful or they don't think its going to have a
serious consequence.68

62

For an explanation of FGM see V. Oosterveld, "Refugee Status for Female
Circumcision Fugitives: Building a Canadian Precedent" 51 U. Toronto Faculty L.
Rev. 277 at 279-85.
63 Re B. (P. V), [1994] C.R.D.D. No. 12 (QL); Canadian Press (30 September
1994) (QL).
64 Canadian Press (1 November 1994) (QL). For a similar reaction in the UK
see J. Flint, "Putting rites to wrong" Manchester Guardian Weekly (22 May 1994)
25.
65 Canadian Press (14 April 1995) (QL).
66 Canadian Press (7 March 1994) (QL).
67 Canadian Press (8 March 1994) (QL).
68 Canadian Press (I I April 1994) (QL).
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The first case in which a person has been granted refugee status
in Canada on the basis of the threat of FGM is Re B. (P. V). 69 In this
case a Somali mother sought to remain in Canada in part to ensure
that her daughter would not be forced to endure FGM as she had.
The Gender Guidelines were applied to the daughter.
With respect to the mother, the Board found that due to the
extremist Islamic government women had few rights with respect
to the custody of children. In this case, the mother feared that the
two children she had with her would be taken away by their father,
as her eldest child had been, should she return to Somalia. The
Board found that a woman from Somalia has "membership in a
Particular social group" and that "her rights as a parent and her
right to personal security are not upheld as the international human
rights instruments require." The children similarly were held to be
at risk from the operation of Somali law insofar as their right not to
be separated from a parent unless in their best interest as recognized
by Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child was not protected.
CONCLUSION

Many of the described cases occur in the criminal context, either in
the originating state or, less often, in Canada. The criminal law,
which in general is a codification of the manner in which a state
sanctions what it determines to be deviant behaviour, is also a basic
indicator of public policy. The public policy of Islamic governments
is demonstrated in the PIFS of refugee claimants; we are shown
whether the law is enforced consistently, erratically, or not at all,
and we see how those responsible for its administration carry out
their duty. In each of the cases cited the applicant was found to lack
the protection of the state, either because the state was the
persecutor or the state was unable, or refused, to protect the
claimant. Measured by international standards of fairness and
equality, these cases expose serious flaws in the administration of
justice in many Islamic states. While the Canadian refugee
determination process offers relief to some of its victims, dearly it
does nothing to remedy the systemic defects of other states.

69

[1994] C.R.D.D. No. 12 (QL).
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Although in fairness, these cases represent the worst situations that
occur in those states, the reality is that the traffic in refugees is oneway.

